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THE MATTHEW SHEPARD AND JAMES BYRD, JR., HATE
CRIMES PREVENTION ACT: A CRIMINAL LAW
PERSPECTIVE
Meredith Boram*
I. INTRODUCTION
[H]ate crimes ... leave deep scars not only on the victims,
but on our larger community. They weaken the sense that
we are one people with common values and a common
future. They tear us apart when we should be moving closer
together. They are acts of violence against America itself..
. As part of our preparation for the new century, it is time
for us to mount an all-out assault on hate crimes, to punish
them swiftly and severely, and to do more to prevent them
from happening in the first place. We must begin with a
deeper understanding of the problem itself.'
1998 was a banner year for people killing out of enhanced animus.2
On June 7, 1998, James Byrd Jr., a 49-year-old African-American
man, accepted a ride from three white men who, instead of taking
him home, beat him, took off his clothes, chained him naked to the
back of their truck, and dragged him to his death.3 On October 6,
1998, Matthew Shepard, a 21-year-old gay college student, also
accepted a ride and was not taken home. Instead he was driven to a
remote area, tied to a fence, beaten within an inch of his life, and left
to die.4 These brutal killings were committed because of animus
* J.D. Candidate, University of Baltimore School of Law, 2016. I thank Professor J.
Amy Dillard for her insightful guidance and help, and I thank my Mom for always
encouraging me to follow my dreams. I dedicate this Comment to my fiancee,
Hannah Martin, whose endless love and support inspires me every day.
1. Presidential Radio Address, C-SPAN (June 7, 1997), http://www.c-
span.org/video/?86359-1/presidential-radio-address (statement of President Bill
Clinton).
2. Animus is defined as "[i]ll will" and class-based animus is a "prejudicial disposition
toward a discernible, usu[ally] constitutionally protected, group of persons." Animus,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
3. DONALD ALTSCHILLER, HATE CRIMES: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 50 (1999).
4. Id. at 51. A passerby found Shepard 18 hours later barely alive. Id. He remained in a
coma for several days then died on October 12, 1998. Id.
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towards the victims' race and sexual orientation, and, consequently,
brought hate crimes5 to the nation's attention.6
At that time, the Civil Rights Act7 provided the only substantive
federal offense that punished crimes committed out of enhanced
animus. However, coverage limitations made successful
prosecutions under the Civil Rights Act especially difficult.8  The
murders of Byrd and Shepard highlighted the limitations of the Act;
most significantly that it did not include sexual orientation as a
protected class.' Thus, in direct response, the fact that Byrd's
murderers could have been prosecuted under the Civil Rights Act, but
Shepard's murderers could not, led Congress to begin efforts to
ameliorate the Act's deficiencies.' 0
Despite the public outcry after Shepard's brutal murder," most
Americans maintained some degree of animus towards LGBT
people.12  During the 1990s, this LGBT animus 3 was such a
widespread problem that Congress even passed legislation rooted in
it. 4 Society's acceptance of LGBT animus meant that any bill that
included sexual orientation as a protected class faced an uphill
5. A hate crime is an "attack upon the person or property of an individual motivated by
hatred of a characteristic of that person, such as race, religion, gender, sexual
orientation, or ethnicity." Theresa Suozzi et al., Crimes Motivated by Hatred: The
Constitutionality and Impact of Hate Crime Legislation in the United States, 1
SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 29, 31 (1995).
6. On October 15, 1998, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution
condemning the murder of Matthew Shepard as a hate crime. ALTSCHILLER, supra
note 3, at 51.
7. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)
(2012)).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2).
9. Id.
10. Benjamin B. Wagner, Unique Approaches for a Unique Type of Crime: Prosecuting
Hate Crimes, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/civil-
rights/hate-crimes (last updated July 8, 2015).
11. The Lesson of Matthew Shepard, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 1998), http://www.nytimes.co
m/1998/10/17/opinion/the-lesson-of-matthew-shepard.html ("It is a murder that seems
to have aroused the deepest decent sympathies of the nation, a case in which law,
religion, love, dignity and politics all seem on the side of a dead young gay man. It is
a rare moment, and politicians and preachers had better take a lesson.").
12. See Kenneth J. Bartschi, The Two Faces of Rational Basis Review and the
Implications for Marriage Equality, 48 FAM. L.Q. 471, 479-80 (2014).
13. For this Comment "LGBT animus" will mean "animus towards LGBT people."
14. Including Don't Ask Don't Tell (DADT) and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).
Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT), 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993), repealed by Don't Ask,
Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010); Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996), invalidated by United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
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battle,15 which is the reason it took Congress eleven years to pass
such a bill.
In 2009, Congress finally passed the Matthew Shepard and James
Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act (Shepard-Byrd Act), which
created a substantive offense for crimes committed because of
animus, including LGBT animus. 6 While signing the bill into law,
President Obama stated that, "[a]fter more than a decade of
opposition and delay, we've passed inclusive hate crimes legislation
to help protect our citizens from violence based on what they look
like, who they love, how they pray or who they are."17 Codified as 18
U.S.C. § 249(a), the Shepard-Byrd Act punishes anyone who
"willfully causes bodily injury to any person or... attempts to cause
bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived
religion [or] national origin .. .of any person,"18 or, "the actual or
perceived ... gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability
of any person."' 19 The Shepard-Byrd Act seeks to deter hate crimes
by enhancing the punishment of criminal conduct motivated by
animus.20
The Shepard-Byrd Act, as with similar state hate crimes statutes,
poses problems for scholars because of First Amendment concerns,2'
but it also causes technical problems for prosecutors in how to prove
the animus motivation for the criminal conduct.22  The latter has
15. See infra Part III.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012). Originally titled the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes
Prevention Act, Congress adopted the name to honor Shepard and Byrd.
17. Perry Bacon Jr., Obama Signs Bill Expanding Hate Protection to Gays, WASH. POST
(Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/10/28/AR2009102804909.html.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. See Matthew Trout, Note, Federalizing Hate: Constitutional and Practical
Limitations to the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act
of 2009, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 131, 136 (2015).
21. See generally Anna L. Bessel, Preventing Hate Crimes Without Restricting
Constitutionally Protected Speech: Evaluating the Impact of the Matthew Shepard
and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act on First Amendment Free Speech
Rights, 31 HAMLrNE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 735 (2010) (articulating several First
Amendment concerns regarding the Shepard-Byrd Act).
22. See People v. Superior Court (Aishman), 896 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Cal. 1995) ("The
People have joined issue with real parties on the proper interpretation of 'because of,'
urging us to construe the phrase as requiring proof the bias motive was a 'substantial
motivating factor' in the commission of the offense. The People express concern lest
the causation element of [the California hate crimes statute] become an impossible
burden for the prosecution in hate crimes cases.").
2016
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caused courts to misinterpret "because of' in the Shepard-Byrd Act
as requiring causation analysis for conviction.23 While the exact
causation standard varies, most courts use a "substantial motivating
factor" standard or some variation thereof. In United States v. Miller,
sixteen defendants were convicted under the Shepard-Byrd Act using
the significant motivating factor standard, 4 but on appeal, the Court
overturned the convictions, holding that the Shepard-Byrd Act
requires satisfying a stricter but-for standard.25
Scholars and courts are fundamentally wrong in the way that they
interpret the Shepard-Byrd Act because they do not approach it from
a criminal law perspective.26 The misplacement of causation analysis
for traditional mens rea analysis, regardless of which causation
standard is used, is wrong. 27 This Comment contends that the
"because of' language in the Act adds a nuance to the mens rea,28
that, much like premeditation and deliberation in a first-degree
murder trial, can and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.29
The purpose of the Shepard-Byrd Act is to enhance the punishment
for animus-based crimes30 and the use of causation analysis not only
misinterprets the plain language of the statute,3' but also frustrates
this clearly designated purpose.32
Part II of this Comment provides background on the fundamental
principles of criminal law and the ways the government proves mens
rea in homicide cases. Part III examines our nation's history of
LGBT animus, and the Supreme Court's rulings on legislation rooted
in it. Part IV explains the evolution of federal statutory protection
against animus-based crimes from the Civil Rights Act to the
Shepard-Byrd Act. Part V provides the facts, holding, and
23. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 592-93 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasizing
a "substantial" motivating factor standard or some variation of it for the causation
element).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 593 (explaining that the "because of' language requires the government to prove
that the assault would not have occurred but-for the defendant's animus).
26. While some scholars have applied criminal law principles to the Shepard-Byrd Act,
all did so from the perspective that punishing the animus motivation was foreign in
criminal law, but this Comment contends the opposite is true and this disconnect
actually stems from a societal acceptance of LGBT animus. See infra Part VI.D.
27. See infra Part VI.
28. The additional nuance is "because of animus." See infra Part VI.
29. See infra Part II.
30. Laura Meli, Note, Hate Crime and Punishment: Why Typical Punishment Does Not
Fit the Crime, 2014 U. ILL. L. REv. 921, 937-38 (2014).
31. See infra Part VI.
32. See infra Part VI.
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problematic result of Miller. Part VI explains the purpose of the
Shepard-Byrd Act, and the reasons it, combined with the plain
meaning of the Act, can only signify mens rea analysis. This Part
goes on to explain how the animus motivation required by the Act fits
into traditional mens rea analysis, using the Civil Rights Act, state
capital murder statutes, and the anti-animus doctrine as support.
Lastly, this Comment applies the recommended mens rea analysis to
the facts of Miller.
II. CRIMINAL LAW BACKGROUND
When English settlers founded America, they imported the English
common law, which became the basis for law in the United States.33
In the nineteenth century, the states began to enact comprehensive
statutory criminal codes, both codifying common law crimes and
creating new ones.34 Whether statutory or common law, criminal law
aims to protect society by prohibiting conduct deemed harmful and
assigning the appropriate penalty imposed on those who engage in
such conduct.35
A. Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law
The most fundamental principle in criminal law is that a crime
consists of either an act or omission, known as the actus reus,36 and
the requisite mental state, known as the mens rea.37 The physical
conduct must occur contemporaneously with the requisite mental
state.38 As Blackstone stated, "to constitute a crime against human
33. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1(c), at 106 (2d ed. 2003).
William Blackstone's Commentaries formed the basis for our understanding of
common law in the United States because his material was the source of English
Common Law imported by the founders. See UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW,
THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 4 (2010), https://www.law.berkeley.e
du/library/robbins/pdf/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.pdf.
34. LAFAVE, supra note 33.
35. Id. § 1.2, at 11.
36. Actus reus, Latin for "guilty act," is defined as "[t]he wrongful deed that comprises
the physical components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with mens rea
to establish criminal liability." Actus Reus, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
37. Mens rea, Latin for "guilty mind," is defined as "[t]he state of mind that the
prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing
a crime." Mens Rea, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
38. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 6.3, at 451. This does not require actual concurrence in
time, rather "the true meaning of the requirement that the [mens real concur with the
[actus reus] is that the former actuate the latter." Id.
2016
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laws, there must be, first a vicious will, and secondly, an unlawful act
consequent upon such vicious will."39
Originally, criminal law was designed to punish intentional
behavior or behavior where the offender had knowledge that his
conduct would result in harm.40 Over time, criminal law evolved to
include certain crimes bom out of negligence or recklessness.4'
However, a fundamental concept remained: conduct can be
intentional or negligent, but it cannot be both.42
In most criminal law cases causation is not at issue because the
injury is directly tied to the defendant's criminal act.43  However,
when it is at issue, causation only applies to the actus reus.44  If
causation is at issue, causation analysis is used to find the most
culpable or negligent person and come up with a theory to pin
liability back to them.45 If supervening forces are present in a
particular case, the court must analyze whether the defendant's
conduct set into motion a chain of events that ultimately caused the
result.
46
B. Fundamental Ways Juries Infer Mens Rea in Homicide Cases
Courts have been sorting out how to infer mens rea for many years,
even nuanced mens rea like specific intent.47 Murder, defined as the
39. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 21.
40. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 1.2(b), at 14, § 5.4, at 365-66.
41. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
42. See Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815, 816-17 (Fla. 1972) (citing McDonald v.
Ford, 223 So. 2d 553, 554-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)). Under the Shepard-Byrd
Act, hate crimes are defined intentional acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1), (2)(A) (2012)
(requiring that the commission of a hate crime will be willful, and thus reckless and
negligent state of mind analysis is inapplicable).
43. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 6.4(a). The factual cause requires "that the result would
not have happened in the absence of the [defendant's] conduct[,]" sometimes referred
to as a "but for" cause. Id. at § 6.4(b), at 467. For example, if"A shoots at B, who is
hit and dies, we can say A caused B's death." Id. at 467-68. Whereas if"A inflicts a
mortal wound on B, who, though dying, has an hour to live; then X, acting
independently, kills B instantaneously. Can it be said that A has in fact caused B's
death?" Id. at 469.
44. See id. § 6.4(a), at 466.
45. Id.
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)(b); see also Commonwealth v. Soto, 693 A.2d 226,
229 (Pa. 1997) ("Criminal liability as a principal actor may attach provided that the
defendant's actions in bringing about the victim's death were not overridden by an
independent, overriding, factor.").
47. Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 635, 637 (1993).
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intentional killing of another with malice,48 provides the oldest
understanding of mens rea in criminal law.49 Prosecutors can use any
of four theories to prove malice,5" but only two apply to intentional
killings: the specific intent to kill and the intent to cause serious
bodily injury. Malice is usually inferred from the facts. Most
simply, when the defendant uses a deadly weapon, the government is
entitled to the inference that the offender possessed the intent to kill
or the intent to cause serious bodily injury. 2  A model jury
instruction states, "You may infer malice from the deliberate use of a
deadly weapon, unless, from all the evidence, you have a reasonable
doubt as to whether malice existed."53 Even when a deadly weapon is
not used, the jury may infer malice from "any deliberate willful and
cruel act against another, however, sudden. 54
While all murders are horrible acts of violence, criminal law
recognizes that murders committed under certain circumstances are
particularly egregious. The most common example is premeditation
and deliberation of the specific intent to kill," which aggravates
second-degree murder to first-degree. 6 Courts define premeditation
and deliberation as the moment of contemplating what it means to
48. Malice is defined as the "state of mind which results in the intentional doing of a
wrongful act to another without legal excuse or justification, at a time when the mind
of the actor is under the control of reason." VA. PRAC. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 79.15.
49. LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 14.1, at 416.
50. The four theories are: "(1) intent-to-kill murder; (2) intent-to-do-serious-bodily-injury
murder; (3) depraved-heart murder; and (4) felony murder." Id.
51. Id. at § 14.2, at 428, § 14.3, at 434.
52. Id. at § 14.2(b), at 429-31.
53. VA. PRAC. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 79:17.
54. Id. § 79:15.
55. Examples of circumstantial evidence used to prove a defendant's premeditation and
deliberation include:
(1) want of provocation on the part of the deceased, (2) conduct
and statements of the defendant before and after the killing, (3)
threats made against the victim by defendant, (4) ill will or
previous difficulty between the parties, and (5) evidence that the
killing was done in a brutal manner.
State v. Saunders, 345 S.E.2d 212, 215 (N.C. 1986) (quoting State v. Calloway, 291
S.E.2d 622, 625-26 (N.C. 1982)). Motive often helps the government prove the
specific intent to kill and it also helps to show premeditation and deliberation.
However, motive is not an independent element of the crime, rather it is usually
specific evidence of conduct that helps the jury infer that the defendant had the
requisite mens rea at the time of the actus reus. Gardner, supra note 47, at 727.
56. Most jurisdictions in the United States divide murder into varying degrees for
purposes of limiting the more severe punishment to the more culpable criminal
defendants'. LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 14.7, at 476-77.
2016
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kill another human being. 7 Premeditation and deliberation is an
added nuance to the mens rea, and must be proven in addition to the
specific intent to kill; and if both are proven, the defendant is
deserving of enhanced punishment.58 Another circumstance that may
raise the egregiousness of the murder is the identity of the victim.
Courts have upheld statutes which punish a defendant who killed
another person specifically because of the kind of person the victim
was, more severely than if the defendant killed another person. 9 For
example, Virginia's capital murder statute61 "makes the intentional
killing of a police officer capital murder when the homicide was
committed 'for the purpose of interfering with the performance of his
official duties."'' 61 This adds an additional knowledge layer in the
mens rea analysis and, like the specific intent to kill and
premeditation and deliberation, is inferred from the facts.62
Mens rea can also lower a defendant's culpability for intentional
killings where it proves the defendant lacked the requisite malice.63
Self-defense is the simplest example, but another is voluntary
manslaughter, which is defined as "an intentional homicide
committed under extenuating circumstances which mitigate, though
they do not justify or excuse, the killing. '64 A version of the latter
defense has developed in situations where the defendant kills a LGBT
person and later claims an unwanted sexual advance from the victim
57. Bullock v. United States, 122 F.2d 213, 213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
58. Id.
59. Since the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's capital murder statute in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Congress and state legislatures have enacted statutes
that allow a judge or jury to punish a defendant who killed another person. Id. at 186.
Gregg upheld Georgia's capital murder statute because the statute particularized
which type of first degree murderers were more culpable than others and could be
sentenced to death. Id. at 206. After Gregg, defendants who killed particular people
faced harsher punishment meaning a life sentence or death, but the jury did not
automatically have to sentence the defendant to death. Id.
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (2012).
61. Delong v. Commonwealth, 362 S.E.2d 669,675 (Va. 1987).
62. Id. at 676.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 287 F.3d 965, 974-75 (10th Cir. 2002) (comparing
murder to manslaughter).
64. LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 15.2, at 491. The latter, often called "heat of passion,"
requires the defense to prove: (1) that there was a "reasonable provocation"; (2) that
the defendant was "in fact provoked"; (3) that a reasonable person if so provoked
would not "have cooled off in the interval of time between the provocation and the
delivery of the fatal blow"; and (4) the defendant did not in fact cool off. Id. at §
15.2(a), at 492-94.
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caused the offender to lose self-control. 65  The courts' continued
allowance of this defense, and juries' acceptance of it, exemplifies
the systemic LGBT animus that riddles the judicial system and
society to this day.
III. SOCIETY'S LGBT ANIMUS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ANTI-ANIMUS FRAMEWORK
In the early 1990s, before the murder of Matthew Shepard, the push
for federal hate crime legislation coincided with the mobilization of
the push for marriage equality.6 6 At a time when equal protection for
racial minorities was beginning to face less resistance, the fight for
LGBT rights was met with vigorous opposition from a majority of
Congress openly expressing LGBT animus.67 The Supreme Court
expressed similar LGBT animus in Bowers v. Hardwick,61 but
eventually rejected animus motivation for legislation as
unconstitutional,6 9 and, through a series of subsequent decisions,
developed a framework for proving animus behind pieces of
legislation.70 The framework provides a starting point for proving
animus motivation for criminal conduct under the Shepard-Byrd
Act.7 Congressional LGBT animus shaped how and when the
Shepard-Byrd Act passed, and similar LGBT animus is reflected in
how prosecutors and courts have misinterpreted the Act since.
A. The History of LGBTAnimus
In 1986, the Supreme Court upheld the criminalization of
homosexual sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick.12  The Court's animus
towards gay men in Bowers illustrates the anti-LGBT climate that
dominated the United States into the 1990s.73 In 1994 Congress
65. Cynthia Lee, Masculinity on Trial: Gay Panic in the Criminal Courtroom, 42 Sw. L.
REv. 817, 818-19 (2013). Matthew Shepard's killers asserted this defense, but were
unsuccessful. Id. at 823.
66. Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyeringfor Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA
L. REv. 1235, 1248 (2010).
67. See infra notes 113-14, 131 and accompanying text.
68. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
69. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996).
70. Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SuP. CT.
REv. 183, 187 (2014).
71. Id. at 205.
72. 478 U.S. at 192 ("It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would extend a
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy.
Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots.").
73. Id. at 192-94.
2016
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passed DADT,7 4 which permitted the military to dishonorably
discharge service members solely because of their sexual
orientation. 75  Then in 1996, Congress passed DOMA 76 as a direct
response to information that the Hawaii Supreme Court might order
the State to recognize same-sex marriages. 77  States subsequently
passed similar legislation rooted in animus. 78 For example, Colorado
passed a Constitutional Amendment that "wiped away all existing
antidiscrimination protection that specifically protected gay men and
lesbians at every level and in every department of state
government. ' 79  The Supreme Court eventually struck down that
Colorado amendment in Romer v. Evans,0 holding that it was "born
of animosity toward the class of persons affected" and "if the
constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare.., desire to harm
a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest."'" Romer was the first decision to condemn
animus motivation with principles that would evolve into the Anti-
Animus Framework fully realized in United States v. Windsor.8 2
B. Anti-Animus Constitutional Framework
Through subsequent cases,83 the Supreme Court developed a
framework to help prove whether animus was the motivation for
drafting, discussing, and enacting a particular piece of legislation. 4
This Comment will refer to this as the Anti-Animus Framework (the
Framework). The Framework "addresses the deeply problematic
74. See DADT, supra note 14.
75. Id. (stating a member shall be separated from the armed forced if the member (1)
"engaged in . . . a homosexual act or acts"; (2) "has stated that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect"; or (3) "has married or attempted to
marry a person known to be of the same biological sex").
76. See DOMA, supra note 14.
77. Section 2 of DOMA prevented states from requiring recognition of same-sex marriage
and § 3 ensured that the federal courts did not have to recognize a same-sex marriage
granted by any state. Id.
78. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1994).
79. Carpenter, supra note 70, at 210.
80. 517 U.S. at 635.
81. Id. at 634.
82. The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor topped off an animus
quadrilogy striking down state and federal acts that it held were "driven by animus
toward a group of people." Carpenter, supra note 70, at 183.
83. See id. at 204-05.
84. Id. at 243.
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potential of a democratic republic [that] consistently oppress[es] a
politically unpopular minority."85
To be deemed unconstitutional, the impermissible degree of animus
must be a substantial factor in the legislation's passage, not
necessarily the sole factor, but rather where examining objective
factors leaves little doubt that the bill passed because of animus.86
The Framework examines a variety of factors that may give rise to
the "inference that animus was a material influence in the
government's decision. 8 7 The factors include: "the statutory text";
"the political and legal context of passage, including a historical
background demonstrating past discriminatory acts, and a departure
from the usual substantive considerations governing the decision";
"the legislative history accompanying passage"; the legislation's
practical impacts or effects, including tangible or dignitary interests
of the targeted class of people; and "the utter failure of alternative
explanations to offer legitimate ends along with means that really
advance those ends."88 The Court applied these factors to Section
three of DOMA in Windsor, ultimately holding that it supported the
inference that the passage was the purposeful product of animus
towards lesbian and gay couples. 9 Although the Framework applies
to animus motivation behind legislation, it provides guidance on
relevant facts from which animus can be inferred.
IV. THE EVOLUTION FROM THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT TO THE
SHEPARD-BYRD ACT
Civil Rights legislation, although not considered hate crime
legislation, was a precursor to the modern hate crime laws. 90 The
unequal treatment of racial minorities created the need for Civil
Rights legislation in the 1960s, and modem hate crime legislation is a
descendent of that same need to protect certain classes of citizens
from animus-based violence.91  Courts correctly looked to
85. Id. at 226.
86. Id. at 232.
87. Id. at 245.
88. Id. at 245-46.
89. Id. at 284.
90. JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY
POLITICS 38 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
91. Id.
2016
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interpretations of the Civil Rights Act when interpreting the Shepard-
Byrd Act.92
A. The Civil Rights Act as a Precursor to Modern Hate Crime
Legislation
The 1968 Civil Rights Act, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2),
sought to provide a remedy for the violence committed against black
citizens during the civil rights movement.93 Under this statute, the
government "must prove that the defendant, motivated by bias,
attacked a victim who was participating in a state or local activity.
The offender's prejudice need not have been the sole motivating
factor. '9 4  There were two major limitations for successful
prosecutions under the Civil Rights Act: the requirement of a nexus
to participating in a state or local activity, and the inclusion of only
race, color, religion, or national origin as protected classes.95
Nevertheless, it gave prosecutors a way to combat civil rights
crimes96 by enhancing the punishment for crimes committed because
of racial animus.
Courts generally interpreted "because of' in the Civil Rights Act to
require that the defendant's conduct be motivated by racial animus. 97
Courts frequently used causation language, such as substantial reason
or substantial motivating factor, when articulating whether a
defendant possessed the requisite amount of animus motivation at the
time of the criminal act.98 However, the courts still engaged in mens
rea analysis. In United States v. Bledsoe, the defendant, a white man,
beat a black, gay man to death with a baseball bat.99 After an
acquittal by a state jury, the federal government investigated and
92. See id. Although this Comment contends courts incorrectly applied these standards.
See infra Part VII.
93. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)
(2012)).
94. Id.
95. Meli, supra note 30, at 935; see generally Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73.
96. Today, these crimes would be considered hate crimes. See supra note 5.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1429 (6th Cir. 1986).
98. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 173 F.3d 952, 957 (6th Cir. 1999) ("So long as
racial animus was a substantial factor, other motivations are not relevant."); Ebens,
800 F.2d at 1429 (upholding defendant's conviction under U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), the
Court recognized that there may have been additional motivations behind the assault,
but the jury nonetheless could have reasonably found that defendant's conduct was
"motivated by" the victim's race).
99. United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094, 1095-96, 1098 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that
the killing was intentional, as the defendant afterward told his friend "he had killed a
'black faggot').
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charged the defendant under the Civil Rights Act.100 The defendant
was subsequently tried, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison. 1
On appeal, he argued that the jury instructions did not clearly set out
the elements of the crime, and that if anything, the evidence only
proved that he killed the victim because of the victim's sexual
orientation. 102 The court upheld the jury instructions, stating that
"[t]he district court clearly stated that the prosecution must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the [defendant] attacked [the victim]
because of his race .... The additional information concerning the
possible presence of other motivating factors simply restates the law
on mixed motives.""' Bledsoe demonstrates how jury instructions
under the Civil Rights Act use criminal law principles and correctly
identify that "because of' signals mens rea analysis.1
0 4
B. The History of Hate Crime Legislation
Federal and state hate crime legislation initially took the form of
recording and sentence enhancement statutes, then later substantive
hate crime statutes. 05 Congress enacted the Hate Crimes Statistics
Act of 1990 (HCSA) to record and track hate crimes.106  State
sentence enhancement statutes lengthened the punishment for hate
crimes during criminal sentencing. 07 Opponents challenged state
sentence enhancing statutes on First Amendment grounds, arguing
that the statutes illegally punished protected speech. 108 The Supreme
Court resolved this concern in 1993, finding that enhanced
punishment for crimes committed because of animus did not violate
the First Amendment. 109 In direct response, Congress passed the
100. Id. at 1096.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1097-98.
103. Id. at 1098 ("The government introduced a great deal of evidence which established
that the appellant had a history of violently attacking blacks, and further, that this
attack in particular was motivated by race hatred.").
104. Additionally, the jury instruction explained that other motives for conduct do aot
prevent animus motivation from being proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
105. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 90, at 29.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2012). The Attorney General delegated the task to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation requiring the compilation and release of an annual report of
hate crime statistics. See Meli, supra note 30, at 935.
107. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 90, at 29-30.
108. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 482-84 (1993).
109. Id. at 489.
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Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA),"10
which instructed the United States Sentencing Commission to
provide a sentence enhancement for federal crimes identified as a
hate crime by the trier of fact."' VCCLEA defined hate crime as "a
crime in which the defendant intentionally selects a victim .. .
because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any
person."' 12
Both the HCSA and the VCCLEA included sexual orientation as a
protected class, major victories for LGBT advocates, but the
language of the HCSA and its legislative history revealed that
extreme LGBT animus still dominated Congress." 3 Congress only
agreed to include sexual orientation if express anti-LGBT language
was also included." 4 For example, § 2 of the HCSA states, "schools
should not de-emphasize the critical value of American family life.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed, nor shall any funds
appropriated to carry out the purpose of the Act be used, to promote
or encourage homosexuality.""' 5 Additionally, during debate on the
HCSA members of Congress repeatedly emphasized that sexual
orientation does not deserve the same protections as race. 16 "The
road to Selma did not lead to the right to sodomy .... Homosexual
behavior is a completely different category of activity[,] which
cannot be seriously considered even an analogue of race or gender.
The freedom train has been hijacked."' 117
Conversely, some states enacted substantive hate crime statutes
with protections for LGBT people, but the statutes contained varied
language, preventing any meaningful understanding of how to
interpret and implement state hate crime statutes."18  Professor
110. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003, 108 Stat. 1796, 2096 (1994) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006)).
111. See Trout, supra note 20, at 137.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 994 note (1994) (Direction to United States Sentencing Commission
Regarding Sentencing Enhancements for Hate Crimes).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (1990) (Hate Crime Statistics Act). See infra text accompanying
notes 114-15.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (1990).
115. Id.
116. 135 CONG. REC. 13,499 (1989) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) ("In my opinion, our
society should not enshrine homosexuality on a pedestal alongside race and religion as
the primary focus of our civil rights laws.").
117. Id. at 13,951.
118. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 52-8.5 (2002) (defining a hate crime as a crime against a
person or his property perpetuated because of "race, religion or ethnic origin"), with
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-304 (LexisNexis 2009) (defining a hate crime as a
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Frederick Lawrence identified two main types of hate crimes statutes:
the "racial animus model," and the "discriminatory selection
model."'1 9 The racial animus model punishes a defendant when the
trier of fact determines that the defendant committed the crime, at
least in part, because of his or her hatred towards a particular group
of people.' 20  The "discriminatory selection model" punishes the
defendant if he or she selected the victim on the basis of the victim's
affiliation with a particular group.' 2' This type of statute is broader
than the racial animus model because it does not require animus
motivation. 2 2  Most state hate crime statutes do not fit in either
model and contain ambiguous language that define the crime as those
that occur "because of' or "by reason of ' 23 the victim's membership
with a particular group or malicious intent.' 24 While states addressed
the need for substantive hate crime statutes, Congress did not
consider it a national problem until 1998.
In 1998, the horrific murders of James Byrd, Jr. and Matthew
Shepard brought hate crimes to the nation's attention.' 25  Every
subsequent legislative session, Congress introduced a bill creating a
substantive hate crimes offense, and each year it was defeated
because of Congress's LGBT animus.' 26 Without sexual orientation
as a protected class, Congress could have easily passed the bill in
crime against a person or his property perpetuated because of "race, color, religious
beliefs, sexual orientation, gender, disability, . national origin, or...
homeless [ness].").
119. Ben Gillis, Note, Understanding Hate Crime Statutes and Building Towards a Better
System in Texas, 40 AM. J. CRiM. L. 197, 206 (2013).
120. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6
(LexisNexis 2015).
121. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 1304 (2007 & Supp. 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:107.2 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57; Wis. STAT. ANN § 939.645 (West
2005).
122. See Gillis, supra note 119, at 206-07.
123. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 2010); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 18-9-121 (West 2013); IowA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 2013); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.031 (West 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (2013); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-111 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 193,1675 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:44-3(e) (repealed 2001).
124. Jordan Blair Woods, Comment, Taking the "Hate" out of Hate Crimes: Applying
Unfair Advantage Theory to Justify the Enhanced Punishment of Opportunistic Bias
Crimes, 56 UCLA L. REv. 489, 497-98 (2008); see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
702(D)(15) (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7902 (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-
305(2) (2000).
125. See The Lesson of Mathew Shepard, supra note 11.
126. See Bacon, supra note 17.
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1998, but as quick as Congress condemned Shepard's murder,127
there was an overwhelming consensus that LGBT animus was not as
vicious a will as racial animus.1 28 A prior version of the Shepard-
Byrd Act nearly passed in 2002, which caused opponents to expressly
voice their LGBT animus.129 Yet in 2009, the members of Congress
who did not have LGBT animus reached a majority allowing
Congress to finally pass the Shepard-Byrd Act. 130
C. The Passage and Impact of the Shepard-Byrd Act
The legislative history of the Shepard-Byrd Act highlights the
substantive and symbolic significance of passing federal hate crimes
legislation with sexual orientation and gender identity included as
protected classes.' 3' Throughout the Congressional Record members
emphasized this bill's importance: "Hate crimes do more than
threaten the safety and well-being of individuals. Hate crimes do
more than inflict incalculable pain and suffering on individual
victims. Hate crimes target groups and terrorize communities ....
Let's vow that we will not turn a blind eye to hatred and violence in
America. "12
The Shepard-Byrd Act fixed the two major limitations in
prosecuting under the Civil Rights Act133 by eliminating the
jurisdictional requirement to obtain a conviction for racial and
religious animus, 13 4 and expanding the protected classes to include
"gender, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity of any
person."'35
127. See supra note 6.
128. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
129. 148 CONG. REc. 9,768 (2002) (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("The bill is intended to take the
unprecedented step of making transsexuals and transvestites a federally protected
class .... But I believe Congress should accept that not all human impulses are
necessarily healthy, that not every desire should be pursued .... ").
130. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, § 4707, 123 Stat. 2835, 2838-41 (2009) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 249 (Supp. 2012)).
131. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
132. 155 CONG. REc. 11,086 (2009) (statement of Rep. Wasserman Schultz).
133. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
134. Cf Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
135. Matthew Shepard & James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/crm/matthewshepard.php [hereinafter
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE]. This subsection was enacted using Congress' commerce
power, therefore, to convict someone the government must prove the crime was in or
affected interstate commerce.
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Congress enacted the Shepard-Byrd Act to enhance the punishment
for violence motivated by animus because such crimes "disrupt[] the
tranquility and safety of communities and [are] deeply divisive."1 36
Accordingly, an offender's criminal conduct coupled with the
contemporaneous animus towards the victim's protected status makes
the offender more culpable and deserving of enhanced punishment.
37
Such an offense harms an entire community not only the individual
victim of the crime, which increases the culpability of the criminal
conduct.' Lastly, a conviction under the Shepard-Byrd Act educates
society by showing that if you choose to act on your hatred for others,
you will face enhanced punishment. 39
In the committee mark-up of the hate crimes bill, members of
Congress expressed concern about the "because of' language,
specifically, how to prove the offender's state of mind.1 40 Proponents
of the bill continuously emphasized that varying punishment based
on an offender's state of mind or motivation for acting is not new or
unique in criminal law. Representative Scott analogized the Shepard-
Byrd Act with the statutory grading of murder, stating that "all of
these are crimes already, these are violent acts . . . [there] is nothing
new about state-of-mind crimes. '"141 Additionally, Representative
Tammy Baldwin, a sponsor of the bill, compared the state of mind
proscribed under the Shepard-Byrd Act with that in murder for hire
statutes, stating, "[j]ust as we do right now with contract [k]illing
versus random acts of violence. We often look at the animus in
criminal law. This is a very specific way .... We differentiate in
our criminal statutes, time and time again, based on motivation,
animus, et cetera. This is entirely consistent with that."
142
The Shepard-Byrd Act's plain language and clear legislative
history support interpreting "because of' to require animus
motivation for conduct, but the courts have used an alternative
136. Pub. L. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 249 (Supp.
2012)).
137. See Meli, supra note 30, at 948-49.
138. Id. at 954-55.
139. Id. at 948-51.
140. Rep. King introduced an Amendment to add an additional element, that the
government must prove that the offender acted with the intent to intimidate or
terrorize the group, of which the victim is a member. This Amendment was defeated.
Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1913 Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. PG (2009) (statement of Rep. King,
Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
141. Id. (statement of Rep. Scott).
142. Id. (statement of Rep. Baldwin).
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interpretation.1 43  Most prosecutions under the Shepard-Byrd Act
have imported the "substantial motivating factor" language from
prosecutions under the Civil Rights Act; however, instead of using it
to explain the requisite mens rea, courts used it in place of the mens
rea analysis.'" In United States v. Jenkins, the Court expressed
frustration with the varying standards: "[T]his case stands for the
rather unremarkable proposition that our actions are really never the
consequence of one motivation. Congress could not have meant for
'because of to stand for the proposition that only when motivated by
no other factors than sexual orientation should the law apply."'' 45
V. UNITED STATES V. MILLER
Decided on August 27, 2014, United States v. Miller was the first
to hold that the Shepard-Byrd Act requires the defendant's animus to
be the sole cause of the injury.' This narrow interpretation of
"because of' entirely frustrates the purpose of the Shepard-Byrd
Act. 147
A. Facts of the Case
On September 6, 2011 at 10:30 pm, Barb Miller was startled by
hard knocks on her front door.'48 Late night visitors were unusual for
the Miller household, but, to Barb's relief, she noticed a man
"dressed Amish" outside, so she opened the front door. 49 Twelve
adults and two small children entered her home, including several of
Barb's estranged children.15 The men, wearing miner-style
headlamps, pulled Barb's husband out of bed and held him in a
chair. 5' Barb testified that during the assault "all the boys [were]
standing above [her husband], holding him down, screaming into his
face and ... com[ing] up with the shears .... Cutting his hair....
He was crying and begging."' 152 The female assailants quickly turned
143. United States v. Jenkins, No. 12-15-GFVT, 2013 WL 3338650, at *2 (E.D. Ky. July
2, 2013) (citing United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1429 (6th Cir. 1986)).
144. Id. at *7 (citing United States v. Maybee, 687 F.3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2012)).
145. Id.
146. United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 593 (6th Cir. 2014).
147. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 135.
148. DONALD B. KRAYBILL, RENEGADE AMISH 4 (2014).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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to Barb, removing and destroying her prayer cap, and cutting her
waist long hair to chin length.'
The assailants were members of the Bergholz Amish community
led by Bishop Samuel Mullet.'54 The community developed a
reputation among the Amish Country for the strange teachings of
Bishop Mullet'55 and the abandonment of basic Amish practices.
5 6
The assault on the Millers was the first of five violent attacks planned
and executed by members of the Bergholz community.'57 The
assailants documented each attack by taking pictures as they cut off
the male victims' beards and the female victims' hair, taking pieces
of the hair as trophies.' The attacks left nine victims'59 and the
surrounding Amish Country paralyzed in fear. 160 Beards in the
Amish Country hold extreme religious significance and are a "public
symbol of cultural and religious identity."'
' 6
'
Since the crimes were religiously motivated, 6 2 prosecutors charged
each of the sixteen defendants with multiple counts of committing a
federal hate crime under the Shepard-Byrd Act. 63  At trial, the
District Court used the "significant motivating factor" standard,
64
instructing the jury that for a conviction the government must have
proved that "a person's actual or perceived religion was a significant
motivating factor for a [d]efendant's action even if he or she had
other reasons for doing what he or she did as well.' 65 The jury found
the sixteen defendants guilty of four of the five counts under the
Shepard-Byrd Act. 166
153. Id. at 5.
154. Id. at 28.
155. Id. at 50.
156. Id. at 51 (explaining that Bishop Mullet replaced traditional worship services with
weekly social meetings at his home).
157. United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2014).
158. KRAYBILL, supra note 148, at 5-7.
159. Id. at 15.
160. Id. ("Amish families who had never locked their doors now locked them .... The
sheriffs offices in both Jefferson and Holmes Counties received dozens of calls from
Amish people asking about their safety and how to protect themselves.").
161. Id. at 17.
162. At trial the prosecutors used Bishop Mullet's statement to the media explaining the
reason or the beard attacks as "[ilt's all religion," arguing that the defendants attacked
the victims because of the manner in which they practiced the Amish religion. Id at
105.
163. United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 589 (6th Cir. 2014).
164. Id. at 591.
165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Id. at 596.
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On August 27, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit overturned the convictions, asserting that the significant
motivating factor definition of "because of' used in the jury
instruction "does not sufficiently define the prohibited conduct."'1 67
On October 10, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice petitioned for
an en banc review of this decision, arguing that the panel's
interpretation and application of the statute was incorrect, 168 but the
review was subsequently denied. 169
B. Problematic Result
The Miller decision is fundamentally wrong and illustrates why any
causation analysis used to interpret the Shepard-Byrd Act frustrates
the purpose of the Act. 170 The Court mostly relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Burrage v. United States; there the victim died
from a drug overdose after taking a cocktail of drugs, including
heroin sold to him by the defendant, but the record revealed that it
was impossible to prove that but-for the heroin, the victim would
have lived. 171 The lower court instructed the jury that under the
particular sentence enhancement provision, the heroin only needed to
be a contributing factor to the victim's death. 17 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "at least where use of the drug distributed by
the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of the victim's
death or serious bodily injury, a defendant cannot be liable under the
penalty enhancement provision ... unless such use is a but-for cause
of the death or injury."'73
Burrage is a classic causation case because the proscribed actus
reus-selling heroin that resulted in death-could not be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.174 Miller, as with most hate crimes cases,
is not. The Miller holding and all causation analysis allows judges
and juries to override the guiding purpose of the Shepard-Byrd Act,
the deterrence of animus-based violence, by finding that the offender
had some other motive for the criminal conduct. 175
167. Id. at 592.
168. Petition of the United States for Rehearing En Banc at 1-2, United States v. Miller,
No. 13-3205 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2014) (additional docket numbers omitted).
169. United States v. Miller, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22317, at *33 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2014)
170. Petition of the United States for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 168, at 5, 9.
171. Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 885-86 (2014).
172. Id. at 886.
173. Id. at 892.
174. Id.
175. See United States v. Piekarsky, 687 F.3d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 2012).
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VI. RECOMMENDED MENS REA ANALYSIS FOR PROVING
ANIMUS MOTIVATION
Congress enacted the Shepard-Byrd Act in response to the murders
of James Byrd Jr. and Matthew Shepard. 7 6 While the Act is not
limited to murderous conduct, for purposes of this section, this
Comment is only referring to hate crime murders. 17 7 The actus reus
prohibited by the Shepard-Byrd Act is "willfully caus[ing] bodily
injury" or the attempt thereof.17 If the statute ended there, the
requisite mens rea proscribed would be malice and could be inferred
from the actus reus.17 9 However, the purpose for enacting the
Shepard-Byrd Act was to add a nuance to the mens rea, and that
added nuance is because of animus. 18 0 For it is not the identity of the
victim that makes the defendant more culpable, it is the defendant's
animus towards that identity or perceived identity.
A. Recommended Interpretation of the Shepard-Byrd Act
The Shepard-Byrd Act is necessary to take conduct that is more
abhorrent than the usual murder, because of the defendant's animus,
and make available an enhanced penalty range for that abhorrent
conduct." 1 For example, where a second-degree murder carries a 5-
40 year sentence and the defendant is prosecuted under the Shepard-
Byrd Act, if the prosecutor can prove the defendant had the additional
mens rea, the penalty range offered to the jury may be enlarged to 5
years to life.'82 This does not mean that the jury must give the
enhanced duration, 40 years to life, it merely makes it available if the
jury finds that the animus is so abhorrent that 40 years is not
enough.183  This amplification, because of animus, was the purpose
for enacting the Shepard-Byrd Act. The additional animus is the
circumstance that makes this murder more egregious. Accordingly, if
176. See Bacon, supra note 17.
177. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. Since all hate crimes are intentional acts
the only theories for proving malice are the intent to kill and intent to cause serious
bodily injury.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012).
179. That is already proscribed as criminal assault.
180. Although it does not say "because of animus towards to victim's protected status" this
is the only reading that makes sense. See id.
181. See Meli, supra note 30, at 964-65.
182. This is how aggravating circumstances in capital murder cases operate. See supra
note 59 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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the prosecutor chose not to prosecute Shepard's murderers for a hate
crime under state law,184  and instead charged voluntary
manslaughter, 85 under the Shepard-Byrd Act, the federal government
could choose to step in, investigate, and potentially bring federal
charges. 186
B. How to Analyze Animus Motivation as Part of the Mens Rea
Courts already have a roadmap for setting a potential punishment
as more severe for killing a particular person.'87 To analyze animus
as an additional nuance to the mens rea, it can be treated like
premeditation and deliberation of the specific intent to kill.' This
additional layer of mens rea is similar to the additional circumstances
that can elevate first-degree murder to a capital offense, such as
killing a police officer. 8 9 The prosecutor must present facts from
which the jury can infer that the defendant's animus colored the
specific intent to kill. 90 For example, in first-degree hate crime
murder prosecutions, the government must prove animus motivation
in addition to the premeditation and deliberation of the specific intent
to kill.'9' Animus is the motive and has to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. 9 2 Where motive helps prove premeditation and
deliberation of the specific intent to kill, motive is how to prove
animus mens rea under the Shepard-Byrd Act. 193 The animus
motivation can be proven with circumstantial evidence of state of
mind, just like any other criminal offense. 194 "In cases involving a
necessary finding of specific intent, a jury may draw inferences of
subjective intent from evidence of the defendant's objective acts, and
from circumstantial evidence."'95
To prosecute a hate crime murder under the Shepard-Byrd Act, the
government would have to prove two layers of the mens rea: the
184. Whether because of prosecutorial discretion or because the state lacks a hate crimes
statute like Wyoming did in 1998. Murdered for Who He Was, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13,
1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/13/opinion/murdered-for-who-he-was.html.
185. See Lee, supra note 65, at 820.
186. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 135.
187. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 55, 57-58 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 55, 57-58 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 55.
194. See supra note 55.
195. United States v. Piekarsky, 687 F.3d 134, 148 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing United States v.
Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 333 (3d Cir. 2010)).
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intent to cause serious bodily injury or intent to kill, amplified by the
animus toward the victim's protected identity. 9 6 While the intent to
cause serious bodily injury cannot be elevated to first-degree murder,
the defendant could still face enhanced punishment if charged with a
hate crime under the Shepard-Byrd Act. 197 For example, if Matthew
Shepard's attackers beat him because he was gay but he did not die
until four days later, the punishment should be more in line with a
premeditated and deliberated killing as opposed to just a bar fight,
because of the offender's animus.
The Framework the Court used to determine the animus motivation
behind Section 3 of DOMA provides further guidance for proving
animus behind criminal conduct.1 98  For example, the Framework
looks into the legislative history of a piece of legislation, seeking
statements made by members of congress indicative of motive or
purpose to the bill. In a hate crime prosecution, the government must
look at what the defendant said before, during, and after the murder
to help uncover his or her motive for acting. 99 Similarly, in
prosecutions under Virginia's capital murder statute, the government
can prove a defendant killed a police officer for the purpose of
interfering with his official duties, by looking at statements of the
defendant indicating that he was avoiding arrest.200 These are two
examples of ways courts determine state of mind or motive at a given
time, and analysis under the Shepard-Byrd Act should not be
different.
C. Application to the Miller Facts
Analyzing the facts of Miller using this Comment's proposed mens
rea analysis requires the government to prove the defendants' animus
towards the victims' Amish faith.20 1 First, the prosecutor can present
196. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
198. See Carpenter, supra note 70, at 221.
199. See, e.g., Jaynes v. State, 216 S.W.3d 839, 848 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming jury's
guilty verdict of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under the Hate Crimes Act
where witnesses testified that the defendant directed racial slurs at the victim "before,
during, and after the assault," which was sufficient to establish that the defendant
intentionally selected the victim because of a bias or prejudice against the victim's
race).
200. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text; see also Evans v. Commonwealth, 284
S.E.2d 816, 818-20 (Va. 1981) (finding statements made by the defendant to other
inmates that he intended to escape and had nothing to lose to be admissible to show
defendant's state of mind prior to killing an officer in his effort to escape).
201. See supra Part III.B.
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facts from which the jury could infer this religious animus, such as
the manner and nature of the assault.2 °2 The prosecutor could argue
that the Miller defendants chose to cut off the male victims' beards
because of the significance of beards in the Amish faith.203  This
significance is clearly tied to the victims' protected identity.0 4 This
would be the equivalent of if Matthew Shepard's attackers had
sodomized him during the attack, because the prosecutor could argue
that the method of assault is circumstantial evidence of animus
towards Shepard's sexual orientation. 20 5  Thus proving that at the
time of the attack the defendant's mens rea included animus towards
Shepard because he was, or his attackers perceived him to be, gay.
From this the jury could infer that the attacker's actions were rooted
in animus towards Shepard's sexual orientation.20 6 In Miller, the
government presented expert "testimony at trial [that] demonstrate[d]
that the parties disagreed about the doctrinal significance of the beard
and about whether the cutting of the beard (and hair) was acceptable.
Defendants knew that their conduct would inflict great harm because
of the victims' religious beliefs on these issues. '2°7  Additional
testimony "indicat[ed] that cutting off hair and beards is 'a religious
degrading[.] '208 One of the defendants even testified "the beard and
hair cuttings 'would help stop people' from 'being . . . Amish
hypocrites[.] ' ' 20 9  The manner of the assaults, coupled with this
testimony, is evidence from which the jury could infer religious
animus.
Each of the defendants in Miller, as with all criminal defendants,
would have the opportunity to rebut the state's case and demonstrate
to the jury that he or she did not have the specific intent at the time of
committing the alleged crime.210 That is precisely what the defense
did in Miller, arguing that the attacks were motivated by "a mix of
interpersonal issues-parental mistreatment, personality conflicts,
harassment, power struggles, and interference with family
202. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
204. 28 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012).
205. See United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 609 (Sargus, J., dissenting).
206. Again, the jury may reject this inference.
207. Miller, 767 F.3d at 607 (Sargus, J., dissenting).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. LAFAVE, supra note 33, at § 9.1(a)(l).
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relationships[,]"2"' to create reasonable doubt as to the defendants'
motivation for the attacks.
Ultimately, the jury would weigh the circumstantial evidence of the
defendant's state of mind presented by each side to decide whether
the assault was colored with animus. After reviewing the motive
evidence, the jury could infer the defendant's mens rea at the time of
the act.212 The Miller court drew attention to the fact that the jury
only found the defendants guilty of four of the five counts under the
Shepard-Byrd Act: "the mixed verdict casts some doubt on the idea
that a faith-inspired manner of assault necessarily equals a faith-
inspired motive for assault. '213 While the court used this as support
for a but-for standard over the existing substantial motivating factor
standard, if the same result were to occur using the recommended
mens rea analysis, the mixed verdict would likely indicate that the
jury found the government did not prove the animus motivation
beyond a reasonable doubt. This Comment is not arguing that the
jury should find sufficient evidence to convict the Miller defendants
using the mens rea analysis, rather, that the jury must be properly
instructed or the Shepard-Byrd Act serves no purpose.
D. The Bigger Picture
Scholars and courts have fetishized the phrase "because of' in the
Shepard-Byrd Act since its enactment.21 4 However, all of the prior
controversy came with the mentality that this statute operated as
something new in criminal law, but, in reality, the only thing new
was whom it chose to protect. While "because of' can signal
causation analysis in certain tort and criminal cases where causation
is at issue, it does not always require causation analysis, and it does
not in the Shepard-Byrd Act. The misplacement of causation
analysis is the result of tension between the level of protection
afforded to LGBT people under the Shepard-Byrd Act, and the level
society is willing to accept.2 15
211. Miller, 767 F.3d at 590-91 (majority opinion). Additionally, the defense could
provide circumstantial evidence to support these motives, including testimonial
evidence about prior familial conflicts. Id. at 594-95.
212. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
213. Miller, 767 F.3d at 596.
214. See supra Part IV.A-B.
215. With the major shift in society's acceptance of LGBT people, now is the time to
revisit the Shepard-Byrd Act from a purely criminal law perspective.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Just as Congress cannot purposefully act on its LGBT animus
to cause legal or economic harm,2 16 individuals cannot act on their
LGBT animus to cause physical harm. The intentional, premeditated
and deliberated killing of a police officer for the purpose of
interfering with his official duties deserves enhanced punishment,217
and so does violence motivated by animus. Congress passed the
Shepard-Byrd Act because intentional, harmful conduct motivated by
animus cannot be tolerated.218 However, an acceptance of LGBT
animus has colored the lens through which courts and scholars have
interpreted the Shepard-Byrd Act, clouding the reality that allowing
for enhanced punishment based on an additional nuance to the mens
rea is not only common place in criminal law, but is dictated by the
plain language and purpose of the Act.
216. See supra Part III.B.
217. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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